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ABSTRACT

Rashid, Md Mamunur. M.A., International and Comparative Politics Program, Wright
State University, 2020. How does Relative Deprivation Cause People to Condone
Political Violence? A Case Study of Bangladesh.

How does relative deprivation cause people to condone political violence?
This thesis investigates this question by utilizing survey data conducted in
Bangladesh. Scarcity of public resources, lethal political confrontation and poor
resource allocation make Bangladesh a fertile ground for violence. Although the
survey suggests a relationship exists between relative deprivation and the public
attitude toward condoning political violence, the regression analysis reveals that the
relationship is imprecise. Small sample size, lack of technical capacity, and limited
applicability of the foundational theory may have caused this imprecise outcome. The
study concludes by providing recommendations for future research to undertake a
mixed method for this sensitive topic.
Keywords: Bangladesh, relative deprivation, political violence, leadership and
citizenry approach of violence.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
Political violence is a harsh reality for many countries in the developing world.
However, within academia it is possible to investigate the many varieties of political violence
to help mitigate this challenge. This thesis will explore how relative deprivation causes
people to condone political violence. It focuses on a specific case country, namely
Bangladesh, which is selected through a scientific approach. This chapter provides a
comprehensive overview of the research question: how does relative deprivation cause people
to support or condone political violence?
Modernization theorists Lipset (1963), Rostow (1960), Apter (1967), and others in the
1960s have suggested that if countries of the developing world follow the path of
development through industrialization they would be able to institutionalize democracy, civil,
and human rights. The theory of modernization has capitalized on evidence drawn from
industrialized democracies in Europe. As part of democratic development, western nations
gain strong control over political violence. However, the modernization theory has faced
criticism because when developing nations industrialize, instead of making progress, as
Collier and Rohner (2008) point out, "the below… income threshold democracy increases
proneness to political violence" (p.531). Recent studies in the field of political violence have
contributed in many ways to the understanding of why political violence prevails in the
Global South. Some studies have suggested that ideological differences among contending
political groups as well as deep ethnic divisions encourage the political system to resort to
violence (Bohara, Mitchell, & Nepal, 2006; Wilkinson, 2004). However, the vast majority of
the literature investigates different approaches to political violence, such as how incumbents
use violence to influence voters' attitude, how perceived insecurity makes people vote for a
violent leader, and identifying the trends and patterns of political violence that leaders usually
follow (Onapajo, 2014; Höglund, 2009; Suykens & Islam, 2015).
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Most of the existing debate only deals with the leadership perspective of political
violence. Although the citizen approach has branched out from the broader domain of the
leadership approach, scholarly contributions to the citizen approach are limited. This study
focuses on understanding the citizenry approach of political violence, specifically, how does
relative deprivation cause people to condone political violence? The research leverages the
idea of resource scarcity and the gap between “legitimate expectation and actuality” (Gurr T.,
1968, p. 253), which suggests that frustration pits people against the political system. When
voters place their demand (inputs) into the political system (processing unit) but receive no
results (outcomes), combined with watching other voters' demands being met with rewards,
deprived voters develop vindictive sentiments, eventually leading to condoning violence
committed against the reward-winner. In brief, when an individual feels relatively deprived
based on political preference, that individual will condone political violence. Average
citizens often find themselves relatively deprived based on their political ideologies in a
number of ways for instance, access to public health care facilities.
The gap between legitimate expectation and reality makes people become frustrated,
eventually developing a condoning attitude toward violence. Often it is challenging to
calculate the expectation gap and attitudes toward condoning violence. Numerous
contributions to the literature suggest different parameters to measure deprivation, including
housing, food, transportation, communication, healthcare, and education (McKay & Collard,
2003; Gordon, 1995; Walker & Pettigrew, 2011). However, it is comparatively challenging to
determine public sentiment toward condoning violence. In general, violence is considered as
an unacceptable social event which people don't want to support publically (Lobbestael,
2015). To deal with the challenges of finding out the latent attitudes of condoning violence,
the vignette method is often implemented through experimental survey (Atzmülle & Steiner,
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2009). Thus for empirical evidence, this study will base its data on a secondary source to
study the relationship between relative deprivation and political violence (Haque, 2019).
Rather than limit its scope within a region, this study follows a scientific method to
determine its optimal case study. As developed democracies limit tolerance for violence and
authoritarian regimes offer limited empirical evidence, this study seeks to focus on a list of
developing countries where violence is prevalent. Here Bangladesh is shortlisted based on the
Economist's democracy index and availability of technical resources (Economist, 2018).
This study attempts to provide insight into the citizenry approach of political violence.
The existing literature in the field of political violence is predominantly leadership-oriented.
The leadership approach deals with how leaders use political violence as a tool to protect and
protract power. The process to protect and protract power consists of numerous methods, for
example: depriving one group compared to others, boosting ethnic division, public resource
allocation and promoting religious factions. The vicissitudes of the leadership approach of
political violence make it clear that new research should move forward with a different
approach which can contribute to diminishing the knowledge gap. This research attempts to
present the foundation in one of the under-researched approaches to analyzing political
violence which will help advance the study of violence and paint a comprehensive picture of
this mechanism. Although there are enormous challenges in analyzing the citizenry approach
of violence, this study attempts to establish the basic foundation for that approach. The
findings of this study illustrate how relative deprivation causes people to condone political
violence. The outcomes of the study could help policymakers address deprivation issues that
trigger mass condoning of political violence.
The basic premise of this study relies on survey data derived from a secondary source;
as a result, the statistical significance of the data will largely influence the overall conclusion
of this study. There are two major parts of the dataset: independent variables and dependent
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variables. The survey maker has placed the independent variables at the forefront of the
survey and the dependent variables at the end.
Basically, the survey maker has drawn the deprivation indicators from the violence
literature of western writers like McKay and Collard (2003), Walker and Pettigrew (2011),
and Gordon (1995). The indicators used by those scholars are primarily targeted to
understanding the deprivation status in developed countries. As a result those borrowed
deprivation indicators can fall short of determining the deprivation status of a developing
country like Bangladesh. For example, the survey contains a deprivation question related to
accommodation: how many people do you share a bedroom with? For a developed country,
sharing bedroom with more than three people is rare, while it is common in Bangladesh. As a
result, any question related to accommodation can overwhelmingly produce the same high
score for the majority respondents.
However, the dependent variables are established to identify the extent to which the
respondents condone political violence. The challenge here is to determine how credible and
open the respondents are. Lobbestael (2015) argues that people do not want to expose
themselves to danger even if they support political violence. Additionally, conducting a
survey through a vignette questionnaire requires expert interviewers who can present a
convincing scenario for the respondents. Thus, the actual representation is crucial while
subtle insincerity can distort the outcomes.
Moreover, the survey maker followed a random sampling method to reach
respondents from diverse backgrounds in an attempt to ensure that the sample can represent
the actual demography of Bangladesh, despite its small N size of only 156 observations.
Hence it is cautioned that the sample size of the study may not be random enough. The small
sample size hints at additional dimensions required to fully conceptualize the relationship
between relative deprivation and political violence.

4

This chapter presents the basic foundation of this study along with its scope and
limitations. This study seeks to answer the following question: how does relative deprivation
push people to support or condone political violence? To investigate the question this study
uses quantitative survey data which is designed to calculate levels of deprivation and the
tendency to condone violence. The findings are expected to bring deeper nuance to the
citizenry approach of violence. This study will also expose the relationship between relative
deprivation and political violence.
The following section reviews the literature on this subject and is followed by a
theory and hypothesis discussion. This research concludes with a methodological discussion
of the case, analysis, and recommendations for future research.
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW
This section seeks to determine the factors that cause people to condone political
violence in a democracy. Given that a consolidated democracy intentionally rejects the
adoption of violence, this research identifies what makes a citizen of an unconsolidated
democracy to condone political violence. Democracy scholars have argued that contending
ideology, political polarization and the tendency to protract and protect power influence
leaders of developing nations to pursue violent tactics. Violent events can be used as a tool
during an electoral year, but periodic use of violence to control resource distribution also may
be a factor. Social psychologists have argued that long term exposure to violence encourages
greater support for violence in a population. Additionally, the gap between legitimate
expectation and reality may elicit greater support for violence.
The debate over democracy
The simplest way to define democracy is a system of government ruled by the people
(V-Dem, 2015, p. 9). However, these few words leave plenty of room for the addition of
more illustrative and normative descriptions, which has led to the ongoing debate over
defining democracy. Schmitter and Karl (1991) have argued that as democracy is “not a
single set of institutions,” it is, “contingent upon a country's socioeconomic conditions as
well as its entrenched state structures and policy practices” (p.76). In defining democracy
based on the scope of government, two different schools of thought have emerged: the thick
and thin concept. The “thin” conception of democracy consists of “procedural arrangements”
while the “thick” conception emphasizes a “morally infused substantive account” (Allan,
2006, p. 534). Although it is important understand the application of both the thick and thin
concepts when analyzing a democracy, some scholars emphasize one over the other. For
instance, V-Dem (2015) has presented six different concepts to explain the significant varities
of democracy such as: (i) liberal principle to protect individual rights, (ii) majoritarian
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principle to the will of the sovereign majority, (iii) consensual principle to include maximum
possible perspective, (iv) participatory principle to participate in political process (v)
deliberative principle to make informed decision for the public, and (vi) eagalitarian principle
to establish political equality for all (pp. 23-26). Advocating the opposite, however, Allan
(2006) has predominantly rejected the significance of the thick concept. The author evaluates
the case of Zimbabwe where the voting process is hindered by fraud and corruption. Thus in
this case the thin concept of democracy would simply conclude that Zimbabwe is not a
democracy while the thick concept establishes, with greater nuance, that Zimbabwe is not
democratic because the voters‟ preference has been ignored (Allan, 2006).
The debate over democracy remains incomplete without addressing
democratic consolidation. According to Schedler democratic consolidation is a continuous
process which includes but is not limited to upholding democratic values, neutralization of
anti-system actors, and routinization of politics (Schedler, 1998, pp. 91-92). However, with a
very specific view, Robert Dahl has argued that democratic consolidation refers to a fair,
competitive, and inclusive election with civil and political rights (Dahl, 1971). David Collier
(as cited in Power & Powers, 1988) contends that there are three approaches to defining
democratic consolidation: (i) the actor-oriented approach deals with the willingness of
political actors to operate within the democratic rules, (ii) the event-oriented approach
focuses on whether political events fall within constitutional limits, and (iii) the institutionoriented approach evaluates institutionalization and meaningful changes. Consolidation of
democracy is an unfinished process that begins with a transition to democracy and depends
on the success of sustaining the transition. According to Beetham (1994) maintaining the
consolidation process is much more difficult and extensive than the transition itself and as a
result, “not all who make the transition will be able to sustain it” (pp. 159-160). However,
some scholars pose contradictory views to Dhal‟s conception of democracy, contending that
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regular elections and the fair transition of power with political rights alone cannot fully
portray consolidation (Beetham, 1994). There are some criteria present in the democracy
literature which are univerally used to define whether a democracy is consolidated or nonconsolidated, such as: (a) freedom of association and communication, (b) free and inclusive
electoral contestation, (c) constitutionalism and rule of law, (d) state adherence to legal
national bureaucratic principles and (e) economic growth and respect for property rights
(Linz & Stepan, 1996). Any nations whose governance mechanisms fall under these criteria
are considered consolidated democracies and otherwise are identified as non-consolidated.
How does democracy differ in terms of political violence?
Ideal democracies are depicted in the literature as ensuring public participation in
choosing who governs whom and what rules are applied to limit behaviors for both leaders
and followers. Moreover, there are several indicators that measure the health of a democracy,
such as equality, mutual trust among citizens, and the government's accountability (Bohara,
Mitchell, & Nepal, 2006; Cunningham, 2002). However, as many developing democracies
started emerging only after World War II, the conception of the ideal democracy, adorned
with nuanced principles imported from consolidated democracies proved unfit to explain the
more complex emerging democracies. Rostow (1960), a staunch advocate of modernization
theory, has suggested that gradual industrial development and economic takeoff will enable
“the emergence to political power of a group prepared to regard the modernization of the
economy as serious, high-order political business” (p. 8). There are criticisms against this
economic emphasis, however, particularly the assertion that industrialization in the
developing world eventually leads to full-fledged democracy (Rostow, 1960, pp. 4-16).
Caldeira and Holston (1999) have recognized the stark distinction between “non-western”
and “canonized Euro-American democracies”. Although with altered views, Powell (1981)
and Caldeira and Holston (1999) have suggested that there can be a distinctive scale to
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understand the performance of a democracy, based on a political system‟s capacity of
containing political violence. With an eye on investigating the distribution of historical
legacies of violent political events, Hoppen (1994) qualifies the assumptions implied by
Caldeira and Holston (1999) that the existence of political violence was common even in
1840s western democracies. Throughout the literature, there are attempts to understand the
differences between developed and developing democracies, which have resulted in a
consensus that political violence is a differentiating feature.
Can violence be used as a political tool?
Bohara (2006) and Wilkinson (2004) have argued that political parties or contesting
ideologies can incite violence against those who opt for rival political ideologies or ethnic
identity. More specifically, Onapajo (2014) points out that an incumbent political party can
selectively use political violence to influence the voter. Although Bohara (2006), Wilkinson
(2004), and Onapajo (2014) have argued that violence is a means of achieving certain
political objectives, the literature has yet to fully categorize trends and patterns of violence
and their relationship to the levels of political expectations. Hoppen (1994) categorizes the
trends of violence into two broader categories, namely (i) crime against individuals (e.g.
murder, and stabbing) and (ii) crime against property (e.g. forgery, bigamy, and „unnatural‟
acts), but the author does not address how this categorization is associated with political
outcomes (pp. 601-2). Moreover, while Bohara (2006) contributes to the study of violence
from the perspective of an insurgency, Onapajo (2014) and Höglund (2009) identify three
major phases of violence: pre-electoral, electoral and post-electoral. Bohara (2006) and
Onapajo (2014) conclude that incumbent political parties perpetrate higher levels of electoral
violence because electoral violence is one of the affordable means to influence an electoral
outcome. Unambiguously, the widespread use of violence can cause voters to refrain from
registering to vote, and even trigger fear psychosis that can influence challengers to leave the
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field (Höglund 2009; Onapajo 2014). In a state of political violence, even though there would
be reduced electoral participation, Höglund (2009) notes that “people may vote for security,
rather than to elect leaders based on their democratic merits” (p. 415). From the surveyed
literature it is clear that political violence can be used to influence a political environment.
Why violence works
According to Blattman contemporary conflict literature is more concerned with the
impact of voting on violence than the converse (Blattman, 2009, p. 231) Furthermore, the
author suggests two seemingly opposing effects of political violence on voting behavior. On
the one hand, political violence can create a positive impact on political participation; on the
other hand political violence diminishes political participation. Blattman (2009) argues that
violence can lead to greater political participation, supported by the positive impact of
traumatic events (p. 231). Here, the scholar suggests that the positive impact of traumatic
events can be caused by abduction, torture and violence witnessed by participants who are
politically active. However, Trelles and Carreras (2012) contend the opposite, arguing that
political violence reduces overall voter turnout. Both Trelles and Carreras (2012) and
Blattman (2009) develop intuitive causal logic in their theories, but while backed by
empirical evidence, the data for both is somewhat constrained. Blattman (2009) deals
extensively with civil war whereas Trelles and Carreras (2012) derive their evidence
exclusively from Mexico. Trelles and Carreras‟s (2012) definition of criminal violence leaves
plenty of room for interpretation, such as differentiating politically targeted violence from
violence associated with other social issues like drug cartels and arms smuggling. Jones,
Troesken, and Walsh (2017) draw similar conclusions but their connection of violence and
political participation is limited to the lynching of black voters in the American South. These
two camps have many adherents, but the school of thought which has contended that violence
contributes to increasing electoral participation has been unable to provide empirical
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evidence to prove its point. Bateson (2012), for instance, concludes that crime victimization
increases political participation whereas Blattman (2009) suggests electoral violence can lead
to greater turnout during a civil war. Bateson (2012) and Blattman (2009) reach similar
conclusions, but their contributions to the literature lack conclusive empirical evidence to
back their arguments. Nevertheless, amongst the surveyed literature for this paper it is
evident that to some extent political violence can increase political participation.
What causes elites and masses to condone violence?
The foundation of violence study has two major schools of thought: (i) people are
naturally peaceful, or (ii) innately violence-prone. The great eighteen century European
scholar Thomas Hobbes (as cited in Singh, 1976) contends that men are intrinsically
violence-prone, living lives that are "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short," whereas
contemporary John Locke argues that men are naturally good and gentle in their way of life.
However, the gap between these schools of thought is reduced by present-day rational and
empirical analyses.
Studies of political violence tend to examine the process in which people engage in
violent events. According to Lichabach and Zuckerman (2009) many contributions to the
violence literature focus on the question “How and why do people use violence to extend
their political will over others or to defend their political position?” (p. 84). There are two
major components to this question: (i) violence as a means to extend political will over others
and (ii) violence as a means to defend political positions. Often the difference between these
two sections is marginal or mutually exclusive because the tendency to extend political will
can be done by leaders or followers. Lichabach and Zuckerman (2009) have also suggested
that political violence can be used as a means to political end in a number of ways. Basically,
the political end determines who is the violent actor. Thus, any systematic study to
understand why political leaders use violence as a strategic tool to justify their political end
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falls under the category of leadership approach, while citizenry approach deals with how
political violence offers personal incentives for a citizen. For instance, a leader can perpetrate
violence against civilians in order to defend the regime, an ethnic leader can be violent in the
face of a potential threat, and during election season a leader can incite riots out of fear of
losing votes. Here each leaders‟ tendency to adopt violence stems from their requirement to
maintain hold on power . As a result any violence studies relating to a leader maintaining
their political power falls under the leadership approach. However, Kalyvas (2006) suggests
that the politicalization of private life can motivate people to engage in violence influenced
by polarization, hatred and greed Kalyvas (2006) cautions that the “privatization of politics”
can easily be confused with “the politicalization of private life” (p. 332). It is often difficult to
distinguish whether an ordinary citizen is driven to violence by political motivations or in
seeking personal revenge against friends and neighbors.
In Fearon and Laitin‟s (2000) analysis of ethnic conflict, the authors divide violence
by an elite and nonelite (follower) approach. They conceptualize violence as “explained as
both a means and a by-product of political elites‟ efforts to hold or acquire power” (Fearon &
Laitin, 2000, p. 853). They also contend that elites provoke violence to increase political
support, which creates more hostile attitudes among followers and results in an environment
more conducive to violence. However, nonelite violence provocation can happen to raise
their in-group position while personal motivations like looting, land grabs, and revenge also
contribute to nonelite violence engagement (Fearon & Laitin, 2000, p. 874).
Gurr's hypothesis is more likely aligned with the leadership perception of violence:
“the causal sequence in political violence is; first, the development of discontent, second, the
politicization of that discontent, and finally, its actualization in violent action against political
objects and actors" (Gurr T. R., 1970, pp. 13-14). Höglund (2009) argues that the need for
security drives citizens to go vote for someone who is violent. In Weintraub, Vargas, and
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Flores study of the 2014 Colombian presidential election, the authors state that in insurgency
violence, support for a candidate who opposes peace might increase and support for a propeace process might decrease (Weintraub, Vargas, & Flores, 2015, p. 3). Utilizing arguments
grounded in political psychology some scholars maintain that long-time exposure to violence
can make people support militant policies and parties (Canetti, Elad-Strenger, Lavi, Guy, &
Bar-Tal, 2015; Lavi, Canetti, Sharvit, Bar-Tal, & Hobfoll, 2012).
Also important is an understanding of the literature on violence sponsored by political
parties: what makes people participate in collective political violence in developing
democracies? Answers can be divided into three different sections: (i) individual identity
within a group, (ii) protection and protraction of power, and (iii) resource allocation politics.
Littman and Paluck (2015) suggest a clear problem of endogeneity, where “group
identification motivates violent behavior and violent behavior increases identification with a
violent group” (p. 79). The authors claim that groups recruit their members and motivate
them to engage in violence to pursue economic, political, and social goals (Littman & Paluck,
2015). Often, these kinds of collective organizations motivate their members in such a way
that they are encouraged to go beyond individual integrity in the perpetration of violence,
under the pretext of acting in the group's collective interest. The question that arises is what
do they fight for? Is it a fight against government suppression, a fight against other political
parties, ethnic groups or special interest groups? While there are several possible answers,
intergroup conflict based on the scarcity of resources is one of the most compelling reasons
for violence.
A recent body of literature deals with the relationship between electoral results,
resource allocation, and political violence. Chaturvedi (2005) and Boone (2011) have argued
that in emerging democracies, political parties deploy muscle power, sometimes through
party activists, student leaders, or professional bullying agents. As Chaturvedi (2005) states,
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this is done “either to force ideological supporters of the competing party to vote in their
favour or restrain them from voting” (p. 189). Chaturvedi (2005) further suggests that a party
with lower initial support can resort to more violence than others. However, if the incumbent
deploys resources, then the competition becomes more violent. Boone (2011) on the other
hand, argues that politicians intentionally allocate certain land rights to favor their supporters
and to punish their opponents, consequently inducing massive land-related violence around
elections. While it is clear that leaders have incentives to support violence, it remains unclear
why voters support violence. Gurr (1968) attempts to address that by suggesting that when
there is a gap between an individual's expectations and the actuality, that individual gets
angry and frustrated. Gurr's deprivation argument serves as the theoretical backbone of this
assumption.
Although the majority of the literature on political violence deals with the leadership
perspective other perspectives like the citizen approach are not necessarily excluded.
However, from among the surveyed literature, there are few works that include the citizenry
perspective on violence.
The theory of relative deprivation and political violence
Gurr (1972) presents three major psychological theories of violence, as (i) instinctual
aggression, (ii) learned aggression and, (iii) aggression activated by frustration (p.33). While
there are contending views on whether aggressive behavior is an instinct, Gurr proposes it is
most likely a learned behavior that gets picked up in one's environment. Sometimes
aggressive behavior is “purposive” and goal-oriented against a rival group of individuals
(Gurr, 1968, p. 250). Moreover, long term exposure to a violent political environment often
makes people tolerant and indifferent towards violence. The theory advanced here relies on
Gurr's third perspective on aggression: it can be induced by frustration.
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Voters in a consolidated democracy are often moved by developmental approaches
portrayed by leaders; basically, underlying promises define for whom to vote. By embarking
on the democratic voyage, citizens are promised that their voices will be heard. They will
have a say on how laws are written, rights interpreted, and resources allocated. In the early
days of a developing democracy, citizens organically develop specific expectations, most of
which are based on what citizens of developed democracies have been able to achieve.
According to Gurr (1968), the condoning of violence happens when voters are deprived of
those expectations, in what he terms the gap between legitimate expectation and actuality (p.
253). As groups of voters become deprived by their opponents, despite the presence of
democracy, they become frustrated. These frustrations are often intensified by relative
deprivation based on ideological preferences: opposition versus incumbent. As mentioned
earlier, the sequence of political violence follows the development of discontent, the
politicization of that discontent, and finally, its actualization in violent action against political
objects and actors. Here, the development of discontent can be politically motivated by
groupings among competing ideological forces, but an individual as part of an ideological
group can follow the same process of actualization in violent action against political actors.
While opposing political parties might be blamed for their feelings of frustration, their
higher level of abstraction shields them from becoming the targets of this frustration: it is
simply too unfulfilling to place blame on an entity or institution. Opposition voters, on the
other hand, are not abstract. They are real, voters know who they are, interact with and can
put a face on them. This “concreteness” tricks the frustrated voter into switching blame from
the party to the party supporter. The countenance of violence is simply the manifestation of
their frustration: if opposition voters are responsible for their frustration, then any violence
that befalls them is well deserved. When a voter has been harboring violent or vindictive
feelings towards another group of voters, they will naturally gravitate towards an actor who
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delivers violence against that frustration maker. Instead of rejecting that violence as
undemocratic, feelings of frustration will direct that person toward interpreting violence as
rightful retribution for having caused their frustration. In other words, frustration will cause
that violence to be interpreted as deserved. Over time, a repeating mechanism develops in
which deprivation fuels anger, anger fuels frustration, and frustration causes people to
condone political violence. This mechanism is the underlying argument for the hypothesis
developed here.
Hypothesis
When people see there is a gap between their legitimate expectation and actuality they
feel relatively deprived. As a result, they feel vindictive towards those who are responsible
for the deprivation. Consequently, people feeling this vindictive sentiment throw their
support behind political violence, if not directly, then condoning any violent event happening
before them.
Hypothesis: Greater deprivation will yield higher support for political violence while
lesser deprivation will garner lower support for political violence.
After considering all the surveyed literature, it can be concluded that developing
democracies lack important norms and standard procedures of governance which are
necessary for the better functioning of a nation. As a result, there is a gap between public
expectations and reality. The larger gap means greater deprivation, and when there are
deprivations among those who have not received equal treatment resentment builds towards
those who have. Vindictive sentiment as a result of deprivation encourages aggrieved
individuals to condone violence perpetrated against the others.
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CHAPTER THREE: CASE SELECTION
Where and how to calculate the relationship between relative deprivation and support
for political violence
Political violence is prevalent in several countries. Primarily, this research utilizes the
2018 The Economist's Democracy Index to shortlist some countries which are averageperforming democracies. Keeping limitations in mind, this study focuses on studying
Bangladesh as the best case for analysis. Confrontational political culture provides a breeding
ground for massive political violence in Bangladesh. Moreover, scarcity of public resources
creates improper distribution system which ultimately yields room for deprivation in the
country. This section accounts for the case selection process followed by a conceptual
background on political violence in Bangladesh.
The Selection Process
Political violence as a social phenomenon is present on almost every continent, from
Africa to Latin America and Asia. To study the relationship between relative deprivation and
political violence, this study first must establish which countries fulfill two major conditions:
(i) they are a moderately performing democracy, and (ii) a country with scarce public
resources. To accomplish this, an appropriate indicator for democratic performance must be
determined. The objective is to find a case which is just above the borderline of dictatorship
but below the line of above-average performing democracies. Although there could be
relative deprivation-driven political violence in a dictatorial country like North Korea,
Afghanistan, or Myanmar, this study rejects these cases because there will is limited access to
data for those countries. On the other hand, this study should not include any democracy
which is performing above average, like United States of America (USA), United Kingdom
(UK), and France because a democracy with little scarcity in public resources will more
likely promote peace instead of political violence. To narrow the list of potential countries,
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this study has utilized a ready-to-use tool, the “2018 Economist Intelligence Unit's
Democracy Index (Economist, 2018).” The index itself does not provide any insight into the
level of relative deprivation in the case country even though it can be a powerful instrument
to serve the purpose of the study. However, in applying the democracy index, several
Southeast Asian countries are compatible with the criteria. The democracy index has
identified these countries as 'hybrids' because they are just above the dictatorship margin but
below the above-average performing democracies defined as 'flawed democracy.'
The list of countries with the desired attributes includes Thailand, Bhutan, Nepal,
Bangladesh and Pakistan. Thailand and Bhutan must be excluded because Thailand is
currently governed by a military government and Bhutan‟s adoption of democracy is too
recent to serve the purposes of this study. Pakistan and Nepal also must be excluded because
these two countries exhibit significant inter-ethnic violence which could muddle the data
collection process. It is difficult to separate ethnic violence from electoral violence. As such,
Bangladesh emerges as the best option among the remaining three countries.
Political violence in Bangladesh has drawn the attention of the media, scholars, and
social commentators. Hussain Zillur Rahman, a prominent Bangladeshi social analyst, argues
that political violence in Bangladesh is better understood through power dynamics. Rahman
(1990) classifies these as, “how power motivates the aspiring individual, how ruling groups
accumulate, hold and exercise power within society, and finally to what extent overt
violations of social norms of justice impinge upon threshold levels of tolerance of the
common people” (p. 2622). Individual power entrepreneurs in Bangladesh do whatever is
needed to protect and prolong their power. They rely on power brokers (such as local cadres,
students, or professional agents of violence) to facilitate their transactions. Ruling elites in
Bangladesh accumulate power by rigging elections, orchestrating bureaucratic favors and
often using their incumbency with little regard for constitutional prescriptions. Constitutional
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prescription is here defined as basic human rights like freedom and liberty to work, selfexpression, access to food, health, and schooling. Incumbents use these basic human rights
principles as the basis of discrimination against their opponents, using favored resource
allocation. In their efforts to maintain control, Bangladeshi political elites often turn to
violence as their tool of choice. Several triggers have been associated with outbreaks of
political violence in Bangladesh, the most common being public resource allocation and
distribution, electoral rigging, favoring contractors who support the incumbent government in
different public development projects, illegal river dredging projects, speaking up against the
regime, suppressing the opposition, and war crimes tribunals (Suykens & Islam, 2015). A
large portion of political violence is state-sponsored, also known as extrajudicial killings.
With levels of democracy matching the requirements imposed by the theory and political
violence being such a well-documented part of the Bangladeshi political environment, it
naturally rises as an appropriate case for the test.
Background of Relative Deprivation and Political Violence in Bangladesh
Bangladesh has a long, confrontational political history starting in 1971 after the
political separation from Pakistan. Although a democratic government was initially
established, repeated military interventions into politics have hampered the smooth function
of democracy. The restoration of parliamentary democracy in 1991 inherited many political
attributes that have hindered the government‟s development. The emergent Bangladesh
democracy after 1991 features "a wide array of confrontation, competition, monopolization of
state institutions and (public) resources by the party in power" (Osman, 2010, p. 310). Osman
(2010) has argued that politics by its very nature is confrontational because it has to deal with
conflicting interests. The success of a polity depends on the capacity to balance conflicting
demands to minimize potential damage.
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The confrontational politics of Bangladesh offer a breeding ground for intense
political competition to mobilize and monopolize public resources by the winning political
party while depriving the loser. There are some underlying approaches portrayed by Osman
(2010) which supply the foundation of the political system in Bangladesh such as:
Clientelism and Relative Deprivation
Similar to other countries in the Global South, Bangladesh is marked by clientelism.
In this country, political leaders offer protection similar to a patron, while in exchange voters
give them support for their activities. Clientelism works in this democracy because public
resources are monopolized by the winning power, leaving no room for voters as a client to go
against them. Clientelism is the lifeblood of violent, insecure, and confrontational political
systems (Migdal, 1988). Clientelism persists in Bangladesh despite its pernicious attributes
because the country lacks political leaders are forced to utilize very limited public resources
judiciously to protect and protract their power. Politicians apply those public resources in
two ways: (i) to attract people from opposing groups, and (ii) to retain its in-group members.
Because Bangladesh has a scarcity of public resources, any allocation by state leaders to their
preferred group, ensures relative deprivation.
Political Party, Criminality and Violence
Since the independence of Bangladesh in 1971, the nation has been broadly divided
into two major political camps (Jahan, 2014). Both of these camps are strong enough to
polarize the nation into two different blocks. Although there are several other political parties
which play into the political system, generally the political system comes under the umbrella
of either the Bangladesh Awami League (BAL) or Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). BAL
is a more secular and progressive political party while the BNP is a nationalistic and religious
political party. According to Moniruzzaman, “a dominant aspect of the party-system in
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Bangladesh is its culture of violence. It has become commonplace for political parties to
often engage in street violence (Moniruzzaman, 2009, p. 84).”
Each prime political party has its youth-student wing which serves as the mechanism
for perpetrating violence (Moniruzzaman, 2009). International Crisis Group has reported that
“they (student-youth groups) are used to expand influence and entrench control, often by
force, over resources and turf, including on college campuses” (ICG, 2016, p. 4). The
political party in power exploits the state mechanism to suppress the opposition while the
opposition spares no opportunity to destabilize the incumbent (Khan S. R., 2014). Odhikar,
one of the prominent human rights organization in Bangladesh, describes Bangladeshi
political culture as “relentlessly violent” (ICG, 2016, p. 4). From 2002 to 2013 there have
been 14,187 violent incidents among which more than 40 per cent of the events are classified
as inter-party violence between BAL and BNP (Suykens & Islam, 2015). The two tables
(Table 1 and 2) below show the distribution of political violence in Bangladesh from 2002 to
2013 as well as actor engagement percentage.
Table 1
The distribution of political violence in Bangladesh from 2002 to 2013
Events
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
Total

N
668
639
910
989
2051
274
379
985
993
1096
1333
3870
14187

Wounded
%
4.7%
4.5%
6.4%
7.0%
14.5%
1.9%
2.7%
6.9%
7.0%
7.7%
9.4%
27.3%
100%

N
6015
5833
9433
7896
21607
1689
2413
5975
8542
12159
14442
30353
126355

%
4.8%
4.6%
7.5%
6.2%
17.1%
1.3%
1.9%
4.7%
6.8%
9.6%
11.4%
24.0%
100%

Lethal Casualties
N
%
113
4.7%
116
4.8%
170
7.0%
271
11.2%
330
13.7%
90
3.7%
84
3.5%
105
4.4%
139
5.7%
124
5.1%
109
4.5%
765
31.7%
2418
100%

Note: Data for political violence in Bangladesh is derived from Suykens and Islam (2015)
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Table 2
Involvement of major actors in violent events in Bangladesh (from 2002 to 2013)
Events
N
6330

Wounded
N
%
58578
46.4%

Lethal Casualties
N
%
536
22.3%

%
Bangladesh Awami League
44.8%
(BAL)
Bangladesh Nationalist
6240
44.1% 66112
52.4% 640
26.6%
Party (BNP)
State Actor
3521
24.9% 54963
43.6% 1279
53.1%
Jamat-e-Islam
2076
14.7% 18210
14.4% 450
18.7%
Note: Data for major actors of violent events in Bangladesh is derived from Suykens and
Islam (2015)

Manifestation of Political Violence
An analysis of Bangladeshi political culture is necessary to grasp the magnitude of
political violence in the nation. Essentially, Bangladeshi political culture is rooted in two
kinds of interactions between leaders and followers: (i) institutional: such as boycotts and
strikes, and (ii) non-institutional: such as threats, extortion and murder. However,
Moniruzzaman points out in Bangladesh, “institutional interaction between parties is largely
overshadowed by non-institutional methods of interaction, which create the scope for
political violence” (Moniruzzaman, 2009, p. 91).
Additionally, Moniruzzaman (2009) has argued that boycotts are a necessary
instrument for opposition parties in a healthy democracy. Opposition parties in Bangladesh
frequently use these tactics to undermine the party in power. As a result, the incumbent
government gets the opportunity to make the best out of the absence of the opposition.
However, these boycotts primarily take place when opposition parties are deprived of their
rights to voice concern for any policy, law or bill. According to Ahmed “The usual reasons
given for parliamentary boycott are: not giving the opposition a fair chance to speak in
parliament, partisan behavior of the speaker, rejection of opposition motions and breaching
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the privileges of the opposition” (Ahmed, 2002, p. 203). The outcome of boycotts becomes
messy when the opposition party takes the issue to the streets. As Moniruzzaman has
describes “Armed confrontations on such occasions usually end in bloodshed which leads the
opposition to a tougher stand, thereby taking boycott politics to a higher level
(Moniruzzaman, 2009, p. 92). Boycott and strikes are two of the institutional instruments
which are frequently misused by political parties of Bangladesh. These institutional
instruments breed other non-institutional violent events exposing general people towards a
circle of violent political culture.
Extortion, murder and treats are considered as non-institutional instruments of
violence. Non-institutional means, formally those events have no constitutional backup or
recognition as they involve unjustified physical or mental trauma. According to Hossain
during 1995 alone there were more than 5,000 cases of violence: 60,000 crimes were
recorded that included 1,300 killings, 1,100 abductions and 2,900 cases of torture (Hossain,
1996, pp. 198-199). Bangladeshi political culture encourages political parties to ask their
supporters and loyalists to be violent and aggressive towards their opponents. Any noninstitutional violent event breeds further violent events as response to the initial event.
As mentioned previously, this study seeks to establish the optimal case country based
on two criteria, (i) its democratic performance, and (ii) level of deprivation based on public
resource distribution. Bangladesh meets these criteria because it is an average-performing
democratic country and citizens are relatively deprived based on their political preference.
The prevalence of non-institutional modes of violence such as extortion, murder, and threat in
Bangladesh makes it further optimal as a case study. The theory established here contends
that political parties encourage violent events in order to gain as much as possible from the
situation. Low levels of tolerance and high distrust among political parties and individual
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citizens make Bangladesh a fertile place for violence and the optimal selection for a case
study.
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CHAPTER FOUR:
METHODOLOGY, TESTING THE THEORY AND ADDRESSING THEORETICAL
CHALLENGES
Studying political violence is a daunting issue in social science as it involves risk and
sensitivity. Moreover, factors such as time constraints, budget and technical capacity have
limited the methodology of this study. This research bases its findings on a secondary source
for empirical evidence. The original dataset reflects information accumulated by following a
vignette method. The quantitative nature of the dataset provides an opportunity to reach
conclusions precisely, but it runs the risk of masking nuance which might be important to
understanding the overall phenomena. This section begins with a discussion on methodology,
followed by the test result. It then addresses the theoretical challenges of studying political
violence.
Methodology
The primary expectation of this study is to collect data using a field survey. The goal
here is to assess the theorized connection between relative deprivation and public tendency to
condone political violence. As this study is designed to fulfill the requirements of a master‟s
thesis, there are some limitations like time and budget. Considering these limitations, this
study is based on a secondary source, a survey conducted by Haque (2019) in Bangladesh.
Haque‟s (2019) dataset is utilized because the survey‟s questionnaire complies with this
study‟s theoretical requirements, including data on deprivation and violence. The survey
contains the same two basic concepts established here: political violence and relative
deprivation. Furthermore, the survey‟s operationalization of these two concepts permits a
practical observation of political violence and relative deprivation as variables.
Operational Definition of Political Violence
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Political violence as a term in everyday use is difficult to describe because the concept
itself is ideologically loaded and varied between disciplines. Porta (2006) suggests that any
physical force to inflict damage can be considered as violence while Graham and Gurr (1969)
add that violence can happen to injure people physically as well as to damage their property.
Moreover, violence could be intentional or accidental and it can have political aims. Porta
specifies the definition of political violence as, “the use of physical force in order to damage
a political adversary” (Porta, 2006, p. 2). Violence is divided in two different categories: (i)
macro level analysis- collective, state sponsored, or ethnic/group violence, and (ii) microlevel analysis- individual as the center of violence. This study does not concentrate on the
macro- analysis of violence but instead focuses on the micro- analysis. The micro- analysis of
violence has some adherents in the literature, for example, Gurr (1970) argues that people at
the individual level engage in violence when there are gaps between expectations and
capabilities, whereas Kornhauser (1959) claims that people who resort to political violence at
an individual (micro level) are uprooted socially. However, both Gurr (1970) and Porta
(2006) suggest that violence at in individual level tends to portray psychological factors. For
this study‟s purposes, the operational definition of political violence includes any physical
torture, verbal abuse and property damage caused by political adversary. This study focuses
only on the micro- analysis which includes an individual‟s psychology in condoning political
violence occurring in proximity to them. Here, political adversary is meant by individual
antagonistic psychology caused by contending ideological preferences. However, this study
seeks to identify individual attidues condoning political violence by presenting scenarios that
potray both collective- and individual-level violent events. Here, the aim is to determine the
psychology behind condoning violence by exposing respondents to some hypothetical violent
scenarios.
Operational Definition of Relative Deprivation
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Stouffer (1949) introduces the term relative deprivation in a socio-psychological study
of American armed forces. The observes dissatisfaction among soliders based on the
assessment of their situation compared to other soldiers. Stouffer consciously studies the nonmaterial aspects of dissatisfaction among soldiers. Relative deprivation as a concept is often
confused with relative poverty and relative fulfillment because the basic elements of those
concepts are highly mutually exclusive. Townsend suggests that relative deprivation is the
feeling of unhappiness caused by social comparison of an individual‟s “customs and needs”
(Townsend, 1979, p. 35). Deprivation scholars have broken down the concept into various
categories: absolute-relative, personal-collective and social-economic, etc. Here the focus is
on the personal relative deprivation defined by Greitemeyer and Sagioglou (2019) as “being
at a disadvantage and perceiving this predicament to be unfair are at the core of the
experience of personal relative deprivation” (p.664). The theoritical foundation of this
research limits its scope by focusing on relative deprivation induced by political preference.
This study moves forward with the operational definition of relative deprivation as the feeling
of dissatisfaction among people when their access to public resources is limited due to their
political preference.
This study is motivated by scholarly contributions from (i) Collier and Vicente (2013)
which addresses how anti-violence campaigns decrease perceptions of violence in lowincome democracies, and (ii) McKay and Collard (2003) as they address the best survey
practices to understand the issue of deprivation. The above-mentioned literature deploys a
vignette method which offers each respondent a short narrative before responding to a
question.
Design of the Survey
The primary focus of this study is to investigate how relative deprivation causes
people to condone political violence. It is often challenging to figure out to what extent
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people condone political violence, as individuals intrinsically avoid admitting if they support
violence publicly. The vignette questionnaire is utilized as a potential method to investigate
the tendency to condone violence because it is a method often used by social psychologists
when surveying topics that are difficult for the respondent, like drug abuse, alcoholism,
sexuality and violence (O'Connor, Davies, Heffernan, & Eijk, 2003). A vignette method
follows a procedure to present a hypothetical situation and ask respondents to reveal their
attitudes towards a given scenario.
This study‟s survey has two major sections: (i) the front end of the survey collects
data that serves as a proxy for the respondent's deprivation, and (ii) the back end of the survey
which consists of the various vignettes and collects answers that are proxies for condoning
violence. The primary objective of the vignettes is to encourage participants to replace
themselves within the narrative in such a way that their answers can be perceived as an
honest insight into what they would do if they have been in a similar situation. The survey
includes a random selection process, reaching approximately one hundred and fifty
participants. There are no specific occupation brackets for participants but they have to be at
least 18 years old to participate in the study.
The appendix here contains these generic questions as well as vignettes which have
survey utilizes. It also contains the underlining background and overall thought process
behind each vignette. Note that the survey itself is conducted in Bangladesh although the
questionnaire has been translated by the author to English.
Reviewing Variables
This study utilizes a dataset which includes some independent variables as well as
dependent variables. The list of the independent variable comprises: level of education,
access to electric power, money spent on connectivity, number of people sharing a bedroom,
leisure and exotic food opportunities in a certain time, tendency to borrow from neighbors,
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healthcare affordability, frequency of seeking political help, and time spent on daily travel.
The list for dependent variables contains: attitudes toward condoning violence related to
healthcare, police services, government subsidies, judicial service and labor unrest.
This study attempts to understand the correlation between deprivation and the
tendency to condone political violence. Different aspects of deprivation that average citizens
face in their everyday lives such as accommodation, food, utilities, communication and
healthcare have been utilized in the front end (McKay & Collard, 2003). For a respondent to
be considered a supporter of violence, he or she has to answer the vignette questions on a
given number scale in a way that suggests support for violence. Those scores will then be
weighted against their levels of deprivation. For example, one question asks with how many
people the respondent has to share their bedroom. The question includes a scale ranging from
sharing a bedroom with no one to more than three people. Here it is assumed that any
respondent who shares their bedroom with no one is considered not being deprived at all
while any respondent who shares a bedroom with more than three people is considered
deprived the most. All other respective questions are designed based on a deprivation scale.
However, in terms of calculating the attitudes of condoning political violence, each
vignette question presents a scenario which has been responded to by the participants based
on a scale ranging from 1 to 10 points. Each vignette is designed to portray a situation with
two contending political groups, with one being deprived by the other. In a balanced
approach, the vignettes present violent events perpetrated by both groups and the respondents
are asked to rank how they will react on the violent event presented before them. To address
research biases the survey maker has intentionally avoided asking the respondent about which
group's violent event they react positively or negatively toward; rather they are asked simply
how they will react to the violent events.
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The dataset is coded using 0 to 10 scales. It is assumed that if the respondents choose
0 it means they are following the highest level of condemnation while 10 means the strongest
attitude in condoning a violent event. However the range is broken down in five different
segments, where 0-1 means a respondent is condemning violence, 2-3 means condemning to
some extent, 4-5 means neither condoning nor condemning, 6-7 means condoning to some
extent and lastly 8-10 means a respondent condoning very strongly.
Testing the Theory: Regression Results and Analyses
This section presents and interprets the results of the survey data in order to identify
the strength of the relationship between perceived deprivation indicators and attitudes of
condoning political violence. The dataset is analyzed through several regression models to
study the relationship between independent variables (deprivation indicators) and dependent
variables (attitudes toward condoning violence). Each regression model is designed to
examine multiple independent variables in respect to a dependent variable. Hence, the study
has employed several rounds of ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models with each of
the 9 independent and 5 dependent variables of the dataset. The original dataset contains 156
observations in total. The OLS method is expected to produce statistical evidence to
determine the relationship between relative deprivation and attitude toward condoning
political violence.
In order to analyze the relationship between independent and dependent variables of
the dataset, this study runs models using the statistical software, „R‟. The dataset has
produced five different models and an additional model combining all. The robustness of
each relationship produced by the regression analyses is evaluated here.
Table 3
Models on Deprivation and Violence
Variable

Model 1:
Police

Model 2:
Health

Model 3:
Agro
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Model 4:
Judicial

Model 5:
Income

All
Models

Services
Care
Subsidy
Services
Intercept
0.94
3.24
1.64
0.87
(1.33)
(1.44)** (0.80)**
(1.12)
Power cut
0.05
-0.03
-0.13
-0.04
(0.13)
(0.13)
(0.08)*
(0.11)
Phone Bill
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
Bedroom Share
-0.27
-0.12
-0.09
0.04
(0.14)*
(0.15)***
(0.09)
(0.12)
Leisure
0.00
-0.37
-0.08
0.02
(0.12)
(0.13)
(0.07)
(0.10)
Exotic Food
0.00
-0.04
0.03
-0.06
(0.13)
(0.13)
(0.08)
(0.11)
Borrowing
0.24
0.25
0.10
0.01
(0.12)**
(0.13)*
(0.07)
(0.10)
Transportation
0.02
-0.37
0.15
-0.09
(0.21)
(0.23)
(0.13)
(0.18)
Private Hospital
-0.01
-0.20
-0.18
0.09
(0.27)
(0.29)
(0.16)
(0.22)
Political Help
0.17
-0.11
0.08
0.11
(0.14)
(0.15)
(0.09)
(0.12)
Note: ***p-value<0.001, **p-value<0.05, *p-value<0.10.

Insecurity
4.77
(1.79)***
-0.27
(0.17)
0.00
(0.00)
0.15
(0.19)
-0.13
(0.16)
-0.16
(0.17)
0.16
(0.16)
0.19
(0.29)
-0.46
(0.36)
0.52
(0.19)***

Combined
11.47
(3.82)***
-0.42
(0.36)
0.01
(0.01)
-0.28
(0.41)
-0.55
(0.34)
-0.24
(0.36)
0.75
(0.34)**
-0.09
(0.61)
-0.75
(0.76)
0.77
(0.41)*

Each cell represents Coefficient and Standard Error

In the Table 3, the model of condoning violence relating to Police Service, Health
Care, Agro Subsidy, Judicial Service and Labor Unrest are fitted on the independent variables
Power Cut, Phone Bill, Bedroom Share, Leisure, Exotic Food, Borrowing, Transportation,
Private Hospital and Political Help. A combined model of condoning violence is fitted on the
same independent variables. The estimated coefficient of all the independent variables and
standard errors are presented in the table. To check whether the independent variables have a
significant effect on the dependent variables (condoning attitudes of violence) corresponding
P-Values are also reported in the table. Overall from the model most of the variables are
insignificant. The attached P-Value defines the significance of the data where more than 95%
level of confidence is considered robust.
However, Model 1 reveals that Borrowing is significant at 95% level of confidence
while Sharing Bedroom is relatively less significant at 90% level of confidence. The other
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variables in the model are not significant. Hence, Model 1 expresses that the relationship
between sharing a bedroom with more people inversely impacts the attitude of condoning
violence. In other words, when a respondent is sharing a bedroom with more people they will
more likely condemn the disservice done by the police. Additionally Model 1 shows that
borrowing from neighbors positively impacts the attitudes toward condoning violence.
Essentially, people who borrow more often are more likely to condone the disservice done by
the police.
Model 2 provides more or less the same outcome as Model 1. This model predicts
very precisely with a P-Value less than 0.001 that when an individual is sharing his or her
bedroom with more people they are less likely to condone political violence related to health
care. However, in terms of borrowing from neighbors, the model expresses that a person who
borrows more frequently will more likely condone political violence related to healthcare.
Although the model shows there is a relationship between borrowing and condoning
violence, the robustness of the relationship is low with a P-Value less than 0.10. Moreover,
Model 5 achieves one significant relationship among all the variables. It shows that there is a
robust relationship (P-Value less than 0.001) between seeking political help and condoning
violence related to labor unrest. In other words, when people tend to seek more political help
they will likely condone violent attitudes related to labor unrest.
Overall, the combined model shows 95% significant level of confidence when
drawing conclusion on the relationship between borrowing from people and tendency to
condone political violence. Therefore, when people tend to borrow more, they will more
likely condone political violence in general. In summary, the combined regression models
show that among the nine determinants of perceived deprivations, borrowing has the greatest
influence on attitudes toward condoning political violence. Among the remaining eight
determinants, most have limited (more than 5% chance of error) or no statistical significance.
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From the regression analyses, it is evident that the perceived relationship between
relative deprivation and attitudes toward condoning political violence holds true for only a
limited number of variables. Therefore it can be concluded that the dataset does not supply
significant evidence to prove the hypothesis. As a result it cannot be said that relative
deprivation leads people to condone political violence. There are numerous drawbacks in the
dataset which could have contributed to this conclusion. It could be that the conceptual
framework lacks essential components to support the hypothesis. Additionally, the small
sample size or deficiencies of the field survey could have adversely impacted the findings.
The following section analyzes these potential limitations and their effects on the conclusion.
Addressing Theoretical Challenges
The strength of a social science investigation is not limited by how widely it has been
accepted within the field but rather by its ability to identify new avenues of research related
to the issue. Relative deprivation and political violence is one such theory, first examined by
Gurr in the 1970s. Feierabend, Feierabend and Gurr (1972) argue that when there is a
“discrepancy between social value expectation and value capabilities,” people become
frustrated, “which in turn results in the expression of political violence” (pp. 2-3). There are
several criteria that social science scholars utilize to evaluate a theory. One of the commonly
accepted ways is to look into the strength of empirical data used as a foundation of the theory.
Here, by the scientific foundation, it is established that regardless of time, place, or subject,
the theory must be grounded by empirical data that has been collected to verify the
assumptions. A question that follows is what to do if the data does not support the theory.
Unfortunately, there is no single answer to this question for a social science researcher. One
of the reasons could be that social science investigators operate around very subtle nuances of
social issues which are often difficult to quantify. For instance, Stephen G. Brush‟s (1996)
case study on the rise and fall of Gurr's theory of collective violence based on the relative
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deprivation provides a historical sketch of Gurr's theory, revealing that there was a spike in
the popularity of the theory followed by a downturn when more researchers experimented
with empirical data to verify the foundation. Brush's historiographical analysis is based on the
initial 15 years with 649 citations: apart from 145 neutral citations, there are 181 favorable
and 192 unfavorable citations. As some of the favorable citations turn into unfavorable the
proponent himself brings some ad-hoc adaptations into the theory. Some researchers suggest
that the original theory holds true in some cases when manipulated while some outright
decline the credibility of the theory based on numerical analysis. However, this does not
imply that the lack of empirical evidence has led to the rejection of Gurr's theory of
deprivation and violence. Many other aspects of the theory are still evaluated within the
literature. Nonetheless, Brush (1996) suggests considering the non-empirical aspects of an
investigation along with the mechanisms.
The foundation of this research assumes that when people feel relatively deprived
they may support political violence. In order to study this relationship, this study borrows a
dataset from Haque (2019). The original dataset offers 9 independent variables indicating
deprivations and 5 dependent variables offering attitudes of condoning violence. In order to
collect evidence for the dependent variables the researcher has applies vignette method. This
study is built on the precept that this method helps respondents to place themselves in a
hypothetical scenario, but in reality it appears attitudes toward political violence are sensitive
and as a result people are reticent to expose themselves publicly even if they condone
political violence privately. Therefore, respondents‟ discomfort with reporting their true
sentiments may have impacted the overall outcome of the study. Furthermore, the closeended nature of the questionnaire may have left no room to accommodate the reasons behind
their attitudes towards violence. Finally, the dataset is a small-scale endeavour. Any or all of
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these limitations could have contributed to the face that the variables in the empirical analysis
did not achieve statistical significance in support of the hypothesis.
It is recognized that political violence is an inevitable reality for the case country
(Bangladesh): from 2001 to 2019 there have been 212,535 violent political incidents reported
which includes 207,536 cases of injury and 4,999 murder cases. Moreover, there have been
646 reported incidents of alleged torture by law enforcement agencies from 2004 to 2019 and
1171 reported cases of public lynchings from 2009 to 2019 (Khan A. R., 2020). Population
growth puts added pressure on allocation of scarce public resources, further allowing for
deprivation to occur. This deprivation is systemic, rooted in the relationship between the
incumbent and opposition political parties. The political ideology of Bangladesh is largely
divided into two camps: the progressive secular camp and nationalist religious camp (Jahan,
2014). It could be said that the country accounts for the presence of deprivation and violence
separately but based on the empirical evidence the relationship is not conclusive. As argued
earlier, there are most likely social nuances present in this dynamic which must be accounted
for in the empirical data.
Social and behavioral scientists face challenges when assessing any particular
behavior conducted by self-report method. This approach has some advantages including no
lab requirement, limited ethical challenges and low budget experimentation, but it leaves
plenty of room for suboptimal results. According to Lobbestae‟s investigation, “…aggression
is highly socially unacceptable, and therefore particularly likely to be underreported on
because of social desirability…additionally, self-report of aggression could be unreliable due
to lack of insight” (Lobbestael, 2015, p. 1).
Probably this is likely one of the reasons why laboratory experiments on aggressive
behavior are different from the self-report assessment. The current investigation is a selfreport assessment which aims to determine the relationship between relative deprivation and
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attitude of condoning political violence. The methodology does not permit conducting a
controlled experiment in a laboratory. The biggest challenge for this study is how to ask
respondents about their attitude on political violence: directly or anonymously. Lobbestae
(2015) argues that it will be difficult to measure the actual support for violence by both of
these approaches because: (i) for the overt approach, the respondents will be aware of the fact
that their positive response will be counted as socially unacceptable, whereas (ii) the covert
approach, respondents will not be able to simply place themselves into the presented
hypothetical situation.
At this point, it can be concluded that it is challenging but not impossible to study
how relative deprivation causes people to condone political violence. Similar to other
sensitive social science issues, accumulating empirical evidence on political violence is
difficult because people are reluctant to tell the truth. It is often expensive and timeconsuming to reveal the truth. So the best way to mitigate the challenges of a social science
research experiment is to provide the investigator the freedom and flexibility necessary to dig
deeper into the evidence.
The statistical results do not provide sufficient evidence to claim that relative
deprivation causes people to condone political violence. However, there may be some points
which are obvious but overlooked throughout the study. One of those points may be, for
instance, the theoretical absurdity. Gurr, the pioneer of deprivation and violence theory, was
criticized after he proposed the theory in the 1970s. Several contemporary scholars have
proved that his assumption doesn't hold in several cases. Other limitations with the study may
point to the challenges of accumulating data on violence. No one wants to expose their
attitude towards violence; even if they support violence because they fear social castigation.
Another potential reason may be the limited sample size of the dataset. As violence is a
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sensitive issue, 156 observations may be insufficient to determine the relationship between
deprivation and violence.
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CHAPTER FIVE: LIMITATIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS, CONCLUSION
Although the surveyed literature and background details of the case study have
provided ample of evidence that political violence is prevalent in Bangladesh, it is
inconclusive whether relative deprivation causes people to condone political violence. This
study has identified limitations which may have affected the overall conclusion of research.
This section provides a detailed explanation of those limitations of the study along with
recommendations for future research.
Limitations of the Study
The data does not produce statistically significant evidence to corroborate the theory.
The lack of evidence is speculated to be the result of a less than perfect match between the
hypothesis and the survey designed and implemented by Haque (2019). The following
section will discuss why the dataset does not produce evidence and will shed light on the
problems that can be addressed if this instrument is to be repurposed for future research.
Section 2 of the survey is meant to capture questions related to deprivation, the key
causal factor driving the theory. This section asks several socio-economic questions that are
taken as proxies for deprivation, such as the consumption of exotic foods, frequency of
vacation or use of comfortable transportation. Here it is required to measure to what extent
people are deprived in their daily lives and how these deprivations potentially lead them to
condone political violence. There are several suggested changes to redraft the Section 2
questions:
Section 2- Questions on Deprivation:
Question-1: I feel deprived when I think about what I have compared to what other
people like me have (sense of personal deprivation).
A: disagree strongly
B: disagree
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C: neither agree nor disagree
D: agree
E: agree strongly
Question-2: In my relationship with others, I can get people to listen to what I say
(personal sense of power).
A: disagree strongly
B: disagree
C: neither agree nor disagree
D: agree
E: agree strongly
Question-3: I admire people who can afford exotic food, expensive homes, and
clothes (sense of materialism).
A: disagree strongly
B: disagree
C: neither agree nor disagree
D: agree
E: agree strongly
Question-4: It is difficult to get access to my local elected officer when I am in need
(political accessibility).
A: disagree strongly
B: disagree
C: neither agree nor disagree
D: agree
E: agree strongly
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Question-5: It is tough for me to get police services if I am in trouble (public service
accessibility).
A: disagree strongly
B: disagree
C: neither agree nor disagree
D: agree
E: agree strongly
Question-6: My friend who has political affiliation gets better treatment in the public
hospital (health care accessibility).
A: disagree strongly
B: disagree
C: neither agree nor disagree
D: agree
E: agree strongly
Question-7: My colleagues receive more appreciation than me in my workplace
(personal sense of appreciation).
A: disagree strongly
B: disagree
C: neither agree nor disagree
D: agree
E: agree strongly
Question-8: My colleagues are well off because they are affiliated with a political
party (sense of political affiliation and income).
A: disagree strongly
B: disagree
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C: neither agree nor disagree
D: agree
E: agree strongly
The eight questions above are proposed because the majority of the questions will
provide more information about how respondents are deprived in various aspects of their
lives. Some of the proposed questions have been derived from the scholarly contribution of
Kim, Callan, Gheorghiu, and Matthews (2016). For example, the first question asks
respondents about their personal relative deprivation: “I feel deprived when I think about
what I have compared to what other people like me have.” Here the question has five
different options (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree), and higher values indicate
greater personal relative deprivation. The second question is about personal sense of power
which is also calculated by the same five options scale. The third question is straight forward
to understand how respondents feel deprived in materialistic terms. The fourth, fifth and sixth
questions are designed to ask respondents about their perceived deprivation in getting
political help and public services like health care, and police services. The last two questions
are designed to quantify participants‟ sense of deprivation in appreciation and economic
terms.
Section 3 is the most important of all three sections. The common problem with each
of the vignette questions regards the internalization of the story. The point here is unless the
vignettes relate to the respondent‟s own life; they will not be sufficiently powerful to make
the respondent feel invested in them enough to produce an honest answer. While making
more personalistic vignettes may ease the comprehension process for the respondents, this
approach can lead to an unbalanced vignette which can undermine the main purpose of the
research. This study has some observations on the vignettes borrowed from Haque (2019):
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Vignette 1: The goal of this vignette is to disguise the political party's name but to
prime the respondents about a series of events that happened during the specified period of
2005 to 2015. The problem here is that people can remember who was in government
between 2005 and 2015. Therefore even if the survey maker masks the name of any specific
political party, the respondent can easily trace whom the surveyor is trying to suggest based
on those years. Moreover, asking general questions may be problematic especially when the
majority of respondents have little or no education. For those kinds of respondents, it will be
difficult to comprehend the vignette as well as to relate the presented scenarios. It may also
be too biased to make the vignette more personalistic because it may result in an unbalanced
prompt presentation or may invite more private information that the research shall purposely
avoid. Moreover, the original set of vignettes includes a simple scale which cannot measure
how relative deprivation causes people to condone political violence. Sometimes a space to
describe things along with the simple numeric response can bring some new dimensions to
understand the mechanism. The bottom line here is to figure out if the vignette accurately
represents whether people condone violent events when they see relative deprivation. Based
on those concerning issues, this study proposes the following improvements:
Imagine a situation where a supporter of the opposition party "X" had land which is
the primary source of income for his family. At some point, the land is illegally taken over by
one of the supporters of the incumbent political party "Y". As a result, the evicted man goes
to the police station to file a case but he is denied any victim support. Being angry, a group of
“X” party supporters has beaten up the perpetrator who has illegally held the land. At that
time, the supporter of “Y” goes to the police station to file a case against those who have
perpetrated the violence and the police have responded by positively filing a charge sheet.
Within the next couple of days, all of the perpetrators are arrested and imprisoned for at least
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three years. How would one justify the violence done by the group when they are denied
victim support? Why would one think that those acts were just or unjust?
Vignette-2: At first glance it may appear easier in this vignette to ask people how they
would react toward relative deprivation and to what extent the event has motivated them to
condone violence. The outcome after deconstruction may be unacceptable as the minute
detail questions may stand out and lead the quality of the responses. For example, the original
vignette can be deconstructed into different small questions such as: (I) do you have any
history of illness in your life? (II) If yes, then what kind of illness you have? (III) Are you
able to treat your illness in private medical centers? (IV) If not have you ever face any
difficulty getting treatment at a government hospital (why or why not)? (V) If yes, then what
kind of difficulties have you been faced with in those hospitals? (VI) Do you feel these
difficulties are somehow related to your political ideology? (VII) Do you think people who
support the incumbent government are getting better treatment? (VIII) If yes, then do you
think hospital administration and staff are involved in discriminating against people of a
different ideology? (IX) If yes, then do you think people who are deprived of their rights to
get access to the hospital should have the legitimacy to punish the administration and the staff
of the public hospital? (X) Do you believe in your existing judicial system to bring justice? If
not, then do you agree that when you get deprived of your rights, you feel vindictive towards
those who have deprived you?
So far the best way to ask people about deprivation and support for violence is to
present the original vignette and then to ask them the following questions: (I) Are you able to
see that one of the patients is relatively deprived? (II) Do you think the violent event driven
by deprivation is right/wrong? Explain why or why not.
Vignette 3: This vignette uses a specific year but there should not be any specific
electoral cues because that can make people feel that they will be traced based on their
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political ideology in the given years. On top of that, the scale needs to be replaced by a set of
open-ended questions such as: (I) Do you think one of the farmers is relatively deprived? (II)
Do you think the violent event done by the deprived is right or wrong? Why do you believe
that?
Vignette 4: This vignette is well crafted but the problem is three characters can make
it difficult for respondents to determine how to judge what the police and judiciary have done
to the perpetrator. The respondents may misconstrue the question because of the lack of detail
in the explanation. The vignette needs to explain how far the verdict strays away from
standard criminal law. It should also explain how money and power played an important role
to manipulate the verdict. The majority of respondents have not received formal education so
it will be difficult for them to differentiate that reciprocal violence is not an act of justice, but
rather a digression from the standard judicial decision. On top of that, this vignette is required
to explain that direct involvement in any rape case will result in capital punishment, so when
a perpetrator gets 2 years of imprisonment instead of capital punishment it is a clear
digression of justice coming from the use of money or power. The bottom line is the
respondents need to know that, neither reciprocating violence nor a mere two years
imprisonment complies with the standard judicial decision even though the political system
of the case country promotes revenge violence. In this case, there can be some question at the
end of the vignette as: (I) Are you able to see there is a systematic deprivation in terms of
justice? (II) Do you think a person who has raped and killed someone deserves to be killed
without following the judicial process? The background information is important to let
respondent understand the whole situation before they mark on the scale whether they
support the reciprocation of violence or not.
Vignette 5: This vignette directly asked the respondent whether they support violence
which may potentially result in negation. The question needs to be more individualistic, for
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example: think about a place one works for 18 months where one was just paid for 6 months
of work and the job provider says they cannot pay the remaining balance. On top of that, one
was fired, along with 200 others like oneself. The employer is not paying because of losses
but because of a personal craving to accumulate wealth through depriving the labour class.
The employer has piled up money, property and power which make one frustrated. For
example, within the last year, the employer has bought 5 luxury cars and 8 luxury mansions
in the heartland of the country. On top of that, the Bangladesh Anti-Corruption Commission
including the customs regulatory authority has charged him for illegal transfer of money into
different Swiss banks. One‟s union leaders have filed a police case against the employer but
the local police station refuses to take action against him. In this situation, if one is fired and
refuses to pay due bills, would oneself or one‟s colleagues like the opportunity to punish
him? People started demonstrating in front of the office chanting "we want justice". The
employer is at the office but his luxury car has been parked outside of the office. There is an
immense pressure from the employee so the employer calls the police to help him. When the
police batter the angry employees, they become frustrated and set fire to the parked car of
their employer. Do you think what the employer has done to his employees and what the
employees have done to their employer is proper? If yes, then explain why.
The bottom line is strategic attempts are required when it comes to collecting data on
the attitudes towards violence. Several underlying challenges make it difficult for respondents
as well as researchers to accumulate conclusive evidence for research. For this survey, one
problem is limiting the response options by a numerical scale. Here respondents might have
different explanations for why they chose to respond to a particular number of the scale and
the number may be the same for several other respondents but their explanation for the same
number may be different. Another underlying challenge is most of the questions ask
respondents how they would react/valuate certain kinds of violent events. While each
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vignette needs to have two important questions: (I) “Do the respondents see that someone in
the vignette was relatively deprived?” And (II) “Do they believe the violent event perpetrated
by the discriminated individual is right? Explain why or why not.” It is important to
understand both questions so that respondents can draw their own conclusions on the
connection between relative deprivation and attitudes towards violence.
Challenges of Conducting an Open-End Interview
Based on the suggested changes an open-end interview might help harvest the most
nuance from the questions. But there are some challenges in conducting open-end interviews:
an open-end interview method will require (i) professional research assistant(s), (ii) research
training, (iii) conveyance and accommodation fees and (iv) technical and logistics support.
Considering all these obligations to re-conduct 150 open-end interviews, a big budget is
required. If this study employs two research assistants and they conduct two interviews a day
then it will take 6-7 weeks. Then if those assistants transcribe five interviews a day they will
be able to finish transcribing the interviews in 2 weeks. As a result, the whole process will
take 9-10 weeks altogether. An open-ended interview approach needs experienced and
professional field researcher(s). As this method is not limited to the "yes" or "no" answer
options, it needs to collect comprehensive answers with maximum possible nuance related to
the research questions. As a result, this study needs to have experienced field researchers who
have professional skills and technical capacities to draw out detailed responses from the
interviewees. On top of that, the researchers also need to have training on research ethics and
compliance because without training and knowledge on the specific issue, the quality of the
data collection may be affected. Another important logistical requirement for the project is to
have a meeting room for the interview. As the proposed questionnaire suggests having indepth interviews which might last 2 hours, a meeting room is required to have the best
possible outcome.
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To sum up, this study needs time, a bigger budget, experienced researchers, and some
logistical support to collect empirical evidence from the selected case country. But the
problem is this project is undertaken for a master‟s degree which has limited time with
restricted financial support. If there is a bit more time to conduct some pilot in-depth
interviews based on the suggested changes, constructive outcomes are expected.
Recommendations for the Future Research
Based on the number of violent events observed it is conclusive that political violence
is prevalent in the case country. But the question is: does relative deprivation lead people to
condone political violence? If the conclusion were drawn based on the survey data which has
been utilized in this study, then the answer is no. However, there are some underlying causes
of political violence which should be considered for future research such as:
Micro-level Analysis of Violence: Any future research may consider looking into the
micro-level analysis of violence based on resource distribution and power utilization. For
instance, micro-level violent events happen based on issues like religious practices, access to
natural resources like rivers, canals or unclaimed land, and getting government tenders
(Moniruzzaman, 2009). The above-mentioned issues sometimes provoke people in such a
way that they participate in violent events. For instance, the majority of people in Bangladesh
are Muslim and there are two major factions of Islam widely practiced in that country. Often
people engage in violent conflict based on the differences of practicing religion and in some
cases, that violence surpasses the individual and extends to the village level. These microlevel violent events could provide insight for the condoning of violent events. The
relationship between perceived deprivation and attitudes toward condoning political violence
may require complements to identify the latent attitudes towards violence. As the majority of
the people in Bangladesh are Muslim, new research can lead the deprivation survey by
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asking: “Do they feel deprived when practicing Islam and do they feel vindictive when other
religious factions impose their thoughts on them?”
Mix Method: Any future research on political violence should strongly consider
undertaking a qualitative approach. Quantitative analyses may be easier to calculate and
decide on a given hypothesis, but sensitive issues like political violence benefit from the
qualitative approach, which more easily reveals the underlying factors to supporting and
denying political violence. It is more appropriate if both qualitative and quantitative
approaches are undertaken. Furthermore, the survey of this research has limited the response
by putting scale for the output which is again easy to calculate but there may be some nuance
missed due to utilizing close-ended questions. In this regard, presence of both close-ended
and open-ended questionnaires may yield some important details which can be utilized for
better comprehension.
Conclusion
This research was initiated to understand how relative deprivation causes people to
condone political violence assuming that greater deprivation yields a stronger tendency to
condone political violence while lesser deprivation garners a lower tendency to condone
political violence. But testing the dataset fails to achieve sufficient support for the hypothesis.
Based on the empirical data, the relationship between relative deprivation and condoning
political violence is inconclusive. However, the study reveals several limitations which may
guide future research to addressing the challenges found here. This study speculates that
limited research observations, the arguable foundation of the core theory, and the quantitative
nature of the study, as well as the ability of the survey maker to deal with a sensitive issue
may have impacted the overall result of the study.
Therefore, this study suggests that any future research within the field consider
a mixed-method (quantitative and qualitative) for field investigation. Additionally, it is
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recommended that the survey questionnaire follow an open-ended method to collect the
maximum nuance from the respondents. Individual response collection should be
accompanied by a few focus group discussions.
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APPENDIX 1.1
THE ORIGINAL RESEARCH QUESTIONNAIRE
Section-1; General Information:
01. Interview Date: __ __ __ __ ____ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __
02. S. No. Interview: __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ ___ __ __ __ __
03. Date of Birth/Age: __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ ___ __ __ __
04. Post Office/Code__ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ ___ __ __ __ __
05. District: __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __
06. Gender: __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ ___ __ __ __ __ __ __
07. Person conducting interview: __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __
Section-2; Socio-Economic Status:
1- How often does the power go out in your house?
A: More than once a week
B: Once in a month
C: Once a week
D: Once every two weeks
2- How much, on average, do you spend on your mobile phone bill per month?
A: do not own a cell phone
B: between 0 and 25$
C: between 26$ and 100$
D: over 100$
3- How many people do you share a bedroom with?
A: do not share
B: one more person
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C: two more people
D: over 3
4-How many places did you visit for recreational purposes (at least 100 kilometers
away from home) in the last 12 months?
A: no visits
B: once
C: two to four times
D: five times or more
5-How many times have you eaten mutton or lobster in the past week?
A: have not had any in the past week
B: once
C: two to four time
D: five times or more
6-Has your neighbor, or someone you know, asked to borrow food from your
household in the past week?
A: no one asked
B: once
C: two to four times
D: five times or more
7-How much time of your day is spent on public transportation in order to get to
work?
A: less than twenty minutes
B: between twenty minutes and an hour
C: between an hour and two hours
D: over two hours
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8-Think back to the last time you were seen in a private hospital. Please compare that
experience to your experience in a public hospital.
A: Experience in private hospital was better
B: Experience in public hospital was better
C: Have never been to a private hospital
D: Have never been to a public hospital
E: Have never been to either public or private hospital
9-Have you, or someone you know, approached a politician/elected official to ask for
help?
A: Never
B: Once
C: More than once
D: Often
Section-3; Vignette Questions
1) Imagine a situation when a supporter of a political party "XYZ" was beaten up by
some supporters of an incumbent political party "ABC" in 2005 and the victim went to the
police station to file a case against the supporter of ABC but denied any victim support. Now
think about a supporter of ABC in 2015 who was beaten up by some supporters of incumbent
XYZ and the victim went to the same police station but denied to have support. How would
react on what the police station do to the victims?
a) Support strongly
b) Support to some extent
c) Neither support nor contradict
d) Contradict to some extent
e) Contradict absolutely
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2) Now think about a situation where a supporter of the opposition political party, as
well as a supporter of the incumbent political party, got the same level of heart disease (for
example 79% heart blockage) and both of the patients admitted into the same governmentsponsored hospital. As of the rule, the hospital authority is required to offer first come first
serve facility. But the patient who was supporting the opposition political party was denied a
standard bed rather was offered a floor with limited medical facilities. However, the other
patient who was the supporter incumbent political party was offered a standard bed with
required medical facilities. Being angry with the situation the family members of the
victimized patient beaten up some hospital staff and doctors. In that situation how would you
react to the activity done by the relatives of the discriminated patient?
a) Support strongly
b) Support to some extent
c) Neither support nor contradict
d) Contradict to some extent
e) Contradict absolutely
3) Again think about a situation where a farmer who had supported the opposition
political party in the 2008 election was denied to have government-subsidized fertilizer and
irrigation water whereas a farmer who had supported the incumbent political party was
offered subsidized fertilizer and irrigation. Now in that condition, if the incumbent supporter
yields a huge amount of crops whereas the opposite supporter got nothing. If the victim set
fire on the wining farmer how would you react on that?
a) Support strongly
b) Support to some extent
c) Neither support nor contradict
d) Contradict to some extent
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e) Contradict absolutely
4) Last year a group of three incumbent supporters raped and killed a woman. Among
the three rapist-killers, one of them was a son of an influencing businessman, other was a son
of a member of the parliament (MP) and the last one was a local drug smuggler. During a
trial of the case, police killed the drug smuggler in crossfire and thereafter the court sentenced
the other two perpetrators with 2 years of imprisonment and charged $1200 compensation
money. What do you think about the verdict of the court and activity of the police?
a) Support strongly
b) Support to some extent
c) Neither support nor contradict
d) Contradict to some extent
e) Contradict absolutely
5) Think about a situation where a local industrialist owned a garment factory where
2200 people work. That industrialist loaned 100 million of BDT to a nationalized bank. As he
was facing recurring losses in his business. On top of that, he owed one year salary of his
2200 workers. At that time, he made a plan to flee from Bangladesh with the help of the
incumbent political party leader. Somehow the worker's union leaders came to know his plan
and asked all 2200 workers to punish him. So when he refused the workers to pay their
salary, all 2200 workers slapped and kicked him until his death. How would you evaluate
what the workers did to their employer?
a) Support strongly
b) Support to some extent
c) Neither support nor contradict
d) Contradict to some extent
e) Contradict absolutely
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APPENDIX 1.2
RATIONALE OF THE SURVEY
Section-2 of the Survey
The field study is concerned that there could be some people in the survey population
who had never felt deprived of their need in the public sector because they can afford a
private hospital, schools and economic opportunities. So the section-2 questions will help the
investigator to determine the social and economic statuses of the participant. It is expected
that those simple but powerful questions will simplify the process to analyze the relationship
between deprivation and tendency to condone.
Section-3 of the Survey
Vignette-1: To hammer on the thought process of the research participants, this
vignette has added two specific periods. The reason is in 2005 there was government led by
Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) which has different political and ideological goals than
the 2015's political party Bangladesh Awami League (BAL). The main purpose of this
vignette is to ask a balanced question to find out attitudes of the participants when access to
justice comes against and in favour of their preferred political party. The mechanism here is,
if the respondents support the denial of access to justice for the supporter of their opposite
political ideologue then it can be concluded that the respondent will condone violence
perpetrated against their opposition. The plot of this vignette was drawn from Human Rights
Watch reports published in 2018.
Vignette-2: the second vignette is designed to understand how people are politically
sensitive on basic issues like health care. The survey maker wants to see whether people
condone violence even if there are ways to avoid it. This vignette presents a situation when
the contending political parties‟ decision was wrong and the survey maker wants to see how
respondents justify the activity. If the respondents appreciate what has been done to the
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healthcare provider then it is conclusive that the respondent will condone political violence.
The actual scenario is compiled from the event happening every day in Bangladesh.
Government hospitals have limited seats as because these are offered at literally free of cost.
For example Bangladesh Awami League (BAL) government is in power now so if some
political supporter of BAL gets sick they could easily get hospitalized at free of cost while if
any supporter of leader of the opposition party gets sick then they might have been
hospitalized at free of cost if there is plenty of seats available. Distribution of seats in the
hospital is not first come first serve basis, this is based on political affiliation and linkage
with the leader in power.
Vignette-3: this vignette is designed to delegate a situation where both parties are
victimized by each other. Government is responsible to offer subsidized fertilizer equally and
fairly to the farmers. But often time it is observed that party in power become bias to
distribute fertilizer among their supporters. For example, Bangladesh Awami League (BAL)
is in power now so the government defined distribution channel will put a bracket for those
who are no BAL supporter. The survey maker targets to look into the outcome on how
participants react on each injustice happened among them. Both of these parties did wrong
but the point is to understand how respondents condone the perpetration of political violence.
Vignette-4: this vignette is a bit different from the other vignette because the other
vignette presents two contending political parties‟ activity but this vignette presents only one.
In this vignette, we wanted to see how people expose their attitudes towards a judicial crisis.
Because the survey maker wants to know how people relate violence in general, do they
condone violence all the time or they stand against when there is a judicial crisis. In 2018 and
2019 there had been two murder cases which Awami League government had intentionally
put a rug on the issue because the driver of those murder and rape case was the big shot
political leader of Awami League government.
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Vignette-5: While the other vignettes are designed to understand tendency to condone
violence at individual level this vignette is designed to understand collective tendency. Mob
lynching is a frequent violent event in Bangladesh. This vignette specifically targets to
calculate the attitude of respondent when they see rightful labor movement turning into a
violent event. Playing with the political economy in Bangladesh is just a matter of daily
affairs. The big shot businessmen who use to invest during the election campaign once their
party comes in power they start pulling out their investment with a huge amount of interest.
Those businessmen have big hand over government decision and the policy the government
takes. Having control over the political system, businesses want to make substandard payscale for their workers. They also enjoy a big amount of loans from the government bank and
sometimes don't pay their loan at all.
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APPENDIX 1.3
CODE BOOK
Vignette response code: the vignettes are designed to measure how people support or
condemn certain kind of violence. The range starts from 0 to 10 scales, where 0 means the
most condemnation and 10 mean the most support offered by the respondent. Here the range
between 0-1 means the respondent is absolutely condemning the violence, from 2-3 it means
condemning to some extent, 4-5 means neither support nor condemn, 6-7 means support to
some extent and lastly 8-10 it means the respondent support strongly.
01. Intd- Interview date
02. InNo- Interview number, skip it if unknown
03. InPpl- Interviewer's name, skip if unknown
04. Ag- What is your approximate age?
05. BPlace- What is your birthplace (district's name)?
06. PCode- What is the post code of your place of birth?(please skip if forgotten)
07. PStn- Which Police Station your birthplace belongs to?
08. Edu- What is the highest level of education you received?
I.
II.

Ascribed values: 12-undergrad= 16
6th to 8th Standard= 8

III.

9th to 10th Standard= 10

IV.

Didn't receive any schooling= 0

V.

1st to 5th Standard= 5

VI.

Graduate to beyond= 18

VII.

10th to 12th Standard=12

09. HPwr- How often does the power go out in your house?
Ascribed values:
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I.
II.

More than once a week= 8
Once in a month= 1

III.

Once a week= 4

IV.

Once every two weeks= 2

10. PBill- How much, on average, do you spend on your mobile phone bill per month?
Ascribed values:
I.

Over 300-400bdt

II.

Between 100 to 300- 200

III.

Do not own a cell phone-0

IV.

Between 0 and 100 BDT-100

11. HShare- How many people share your residence?
I.

Ascribed values: Do not share-1

II.

One more person-2

III.

Two more people-3

12. PlsVst- How many places did you visit for recreational purposes (at least 100
kilometers away from home) in the last 12 months?
Ascribed value:
I.
II.
III.

Two to four times-4
No visits-0
Once-1

13. ExoFood- How many times have you eaten mutton or lobster in the past week?
Ascribed values:
I.
II.
III.

Have not had any in the past week-0
Two to four time-4
Five times or more-6
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14. BrwNgbr- Has your neighbor, or someone you know, asked to borrow food (for
example: sugar, rice, milk and/or potato) from your household in the past week?)
Ascribed values:
I.

One come once-1

II.

No one asked- 0

III.

Two to four time-4

IV.

Five times or more-6

15. Transp- How much time do you spend on local public transportation in order to get to
work from home?
Ascribed values:
I.
II.

Between an hour and two hours-2
Less than twenty minutes -0.5

III.

I don't use any local transportation-0

IV.

Over two hours- 3

16. PvtHspt- Think back to the last time you were seen in a private hospital. Please
compare that experience to your experience in a public hospital.
Values set:
I.

Experience in private hospital was better-3

II.

Experience in public hospital was better-2

III.

Have never been to either public or private hospital-0

IV.

Have never been to a public hospital-0

V.

Experience in the public and private hospital is the same-1

17. AppHelp- Have you, or someone you know, approached a politician/ leader or elected
official to ask for help?
I.

Never-0
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II.

More than five times-6

III.

Two to four time-4

IV.

Five times or more-6

18. v1PoliceAct: vignette on access to police station
19. v2Treatment: access to hospitalization
20. v3Subsidy: violence for subsidy
21. v4Justice: violence for access to justice
22. v5Industry: based on labor wage
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